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Corporations-Effect of Statements Made In
Stock Prospectus
In the case of United Funds, Inc. v. CarterProducts, Inc.,' the City

Circuit Court of Baltimore, Maryland, handed down a decision which
"broke new legal ground."2 The case, involving the effect of statements made in stock prospectuses on a corporation's future actions,
has provoked surprisingly little discussion by legal commentators, 3
and none at all on the "new" ground it broke. 4 The purpose of this
comment is to examine the Carter Products decision, to attempt to
place it in proper legal perspective, and finally to evaluate it as a
new development in the law.
In 1957 certain shareholders of Carter Products, Inc., including one
Hoyt, offered stock for sale to the public. The prospectus by which
the shares were sold said that "the Company intends to make application for the listing of the Common Stock on the New York Stock
Exchange." 5 Plaintiffs, three investment companies, bought stock in
that offering. Shortly thereafter the stock was listed on the Exchange.
The Exchange wared Carter that if it later created a class of nonvoting common stock it would be delisted. In spite of this warning,
Carter's board of directors (controlled by Hoyt, who owned over
fifty per cent of the outstanding stock) adopted a resolution that
Carter issue four million shares of non-voting common stock. Plaintiffs
brought this action to enjoin the issuance of the non-voting stock.
At the trial, plaintiffs introduced evidence tending to show that (1)
delisting would damage both Carter and its shareholders in a variety
of ways, 6 especially by causing a sharp decrease in the market value
of Carter stock;7 (2) plaintiffs purchased Carter stock in reliance upon
the prospectus and the Exchange listing;8 and (3) the purpose of
the creation of the non-voting stock was to enable Hoyt to sell Carter
stock without losing his voting control. 9 Plaintiffs relied on several
1. CCH FED. SEC. L. REr'. ff 91,288 (Baltimore, Md., City Cir. Ct., May 16, 1963).
2. United Funds, Inc. v. Carter Prods., Inc., CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1 91,316, at

94,362 (Baltimore, Md., City Cir. Ct., Jan. 8, 1964). This was a later stage in the case,
in which the court awarded complainants reimbursement from the corporation for
counsel fees.
3. Only two articles were found: 77 HInv. L. REv. 757 (1964); 49 VA. L. Rlv. 1216
(1963).
4. It was dismissed in a footnote in one article. 49 VA. L. REv. 1216, 1217 n.3
(1963): "[Tihe propriety of applying the doctrine on these facts would seem to be
highly doubtful, especially since the promise is implied rather than expressed."
5. United Funds, Inc. v. Carter Prods., Inc., supra note 1, at 94,281.
6. See Brief for Complainants pp. 7-17, United Funds, Inc. v. Carter Prods., Inc.,
supra note 1.
7. Id. at 10-17.
8. Id. at 17-18.
9. Id. at 22-28.
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theories, 10 most of which were adopted by the court." However, although the court later stated that it based its decision on alternative
grounds,' 2 it said at the beginning of the opinion that it considered
two questions dispositive of the cause: First, does the prospectus give
the plaintiffs a legal or equitable right? Second, does the proposed
creation of a non-voting common stock violate such a right?
Looking to custom and usage in the field of securities, 13 the court
said:
the statement in the prospectus as to Carter's intent to apply for listing of its
stock with the N.Y.S.E. had a meaning established by generally known
usage and practice in the financial world. Under this usage and custom,
such a statement of intent is meant to be and is accepted as a promise
that the company making it will apply for listing, with a strong implication,
which in this case was true, that there is good reason to believe the application will be accepted .... [Allso . . .the statement was meant to be and
14
accepted as a promise that the listing would be continued.

The court then pointed out that the rules of the New York Stock
Exchange permit the voluntary delisting of stock, but require a twothirds vote of the shareholders in favor of such action and also require
that less than ten per cent of the shareholders dissent. Delisting is
also used as a penalty-in the case of Carter it was to be the penalty
for the issuance of non-voting common stock. Viewed in the light of
the Exchange's rules, said the court, the meaning of the promise to
continue the listing was that "Carter would not voluntarily take any
action which, under the N.Y.S.E. rules, would result in delisting,
unless that action was necessary to achieve a proper corporate
purpose."15
Having determined the content of the promise, the court turned to
10. Including the following: that the majority shareholders have a fiduciary duty
not to carry out this action for their personal benefit to the detriment of the corporation and of the minority; that it constituted the waste of a corporate asset; that it was
based on a shareholder vote procured by use of a misleading proxy.
11. However, the opinion rejects the theory of an express contract betveen the
parties to this effect. United Funds, Inc. v. Carter Prods., Inc., supra note 1, at
94,285-86.
12. "The right of the complainants to relief is based upon the violation of both
the defendants' contractual obligations and of Hoyt's duties as a fiduciary." Id. at
94,293. By "contractual" the court meant "arising from promissory estoppel."
13. Counsel for complainants has stated that: "The contractual point was quite
difficult and, so far as I know, without direct precedent... .We relied on the listing
requirements of the Exchange and also on the custom and usage of the trade. I went
to great pains to try to develop evidence on the custom and usage of the trade, and
the Court in its opinion placed some real emphasis on custom and usage." Letter From
Mr. Richard W. Emory, Venable, Baetjer & Howard, Baltimore, Maryland, April 16,
1964.
14. United Funds, Inc. v. Carter Prods., Inc., supra note 1, at 94,283.
15. Id. at 94,285.
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the doctrine of promissory estoppel to ascertain its effect.16 In this
case, the court noted, the requirements of promissory estoppel were
met: "The promise inherent in the statement of Carter's intent to list
the stock was reasonably expected by Carter to induce action on
the part of prospective purchasers... and did induce such action by
them."'7 Thus the shareholders had a right to have the promise enforced:
In this case... injustice can be avoided only if the contractual obligations
of Carter and Hoyt are enforced by a court of equity. The damages to the

complainants are substantial but not susceptible of pecuniary evaluement.
If Carter is not enjoined from consummating its proposed action, the complainants cannot be restored to the position which they now occupy as
holders of listed stock, purchased in reliance upon the promise. 18

Only two decisions have been found which are directly in point
with the Carter Productscase. In Jacobs v. Batavia & General Plantations Trust, Ltd.,19 defendant company (the "Trust") issued a prospectus offering deposit notes for subscription. The prospectus stated
that "in the event of the sale of the Rio Bravo estates ... the directors
will set aside out of the proceeds of such sale a sufficient sum to
redeem all the notes then outstanding and will give the holders the
option of being then paid off in cash .......
oThe prospectus also
stated that an option had been granted on the purchase of the Rio
Bravo estates. In response to the prospectus, and in reliance thereon,
plaintiff sent in application forms for deposit notes and requested
allotment "subject to the terms of the prospectus." Subsequently
plaintiff received the notes, which bore on their face a promise to pay
principal and interest, but which did not include the promise made
in the prospectus with regard to accelerated payment upon sale of
the Rio Bravo estates.
When the Trust sold the Rio Bravo estates without giving notice
of the sale to the shareholders, plaintiff commenced an action to
get (1) a declaration that the Trust was bound to set aside out of
the proceeds of the sale a sum sufficient to pay off the notes, and (2)
an injunction restraining the Trust from using the proceeds of the
sale without setting aside such a sum. The Trust defended on the
ground that the notes contained the entire contract between the
parties. The court gave judgment for the plaintiff, holding that the
notes did not contain the whole bargain, but only part of it, with
the promise in the prospectus expressing the rest of it. The court then
16. The court adopted § 90 of the Restatement of Contracts as its model for promissory estoppel.
17. United Funds, Inc. v. Carter Prods., Inc., supranote 1, at 94,286.
18. Id. at 94,291.
19. [1924J 1 Ch.287 (1923).
20. Id. at 288-89.
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ruled the promise enforceable on either of two grounds: that the whole
contract for the sale of the deposit notes was contained in the two
documents; or that the promise in the prospectus constituted a collateral contract, the consideration21 for which was plaintiff's entering
into a contract to take the notes.
22
In another English decision, In re Chicago & N.W. GranaiesCo.,

the court denied relief on facts similar to those of the Jacobs case. A
prospectus issued in connection with the sale of debentures said that
the debentures were "redeemable within seventeen years by halfyearly drawings," and that the company would apply a sinking fund
of k 5000 per annum for this purpose. The debentures stated that
the company would establish a sinking fund of R, 2500 per balf-year
to pay off the bonds at a k 10 premium plus a half-year's interest to
those redeemed. For several years the company put into a sinking
fund each half-year the sum of £ 2500 plus an amount sufficient
to pay a half-year's interest on the bonds that k 2500 would redeem.
Then the company changed its policy and began to put only - 2500
in the fund each half-year. Plaintiff-bondholder brought suit for himself and others similarly situated, arguing as follows: If the company
put up £ 2500 plus interest each half-year, it would be able to pay
off all the bonds within seventeen years. But if it put up only Y.
2500, it would not be able to pay all bonds until the end of the
seventeenth year. And the prospectus said within seventeen years.
The court gave judgment for defendant company. First, it said,
the debenture was the whole contract; the prospectus could not be
consulted to learn the terms of that contract.23 However, it continued,
conceding that part of the contract was contained in the prospectus,
the plaintiff's construction of that instrument was erroneous. The
word "redeemable" in the prospectus meant "liable to redemption"
-not "will be redeemed."24
The Jacobs case can be distinguished from the Chicago & N.W.
Granaries decision. In the latter, two alternatives are presented:
either the language in the debentures was inconsistent with that in the
prospectuses, or else it was consistent therewith. In the first instance,
it could be maintained that by accepting the debentures the plaintiff
agreed to the altered terms. In the second, where the language of
the prospectus is so construed as to be consistent with that in the
debenture (as the court did), there is no cause of action. In Jacobs,
on the other hand, there was no possibility of inconsistency; the notes
were silent as to the sale of the Rio Bravo estates. To the extent
21. The court found it clear that the corporation originally intended to honor its
promise. Id. at 298.
22. [1898] 1 Ch.263 (1897).
23. Id. at 266.
24. Id. at 267.
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the two cases cannot be so reconciled, the Jacobs case is the more
recent authority.
The few American decisions dealing with prospectus promises are
in the area of fraud, used as a ground for the recovery of amounts
paid for stock. Edward Brockhaus & Co. v. Gilson 5 was an action
to void a sale of stock. The prospectus had said that "the company
has agreed to make application to list this stock on the Chicago Curb
Exchange." It also said that the "proceeds from the sale of this stock
are to be used for the acquisition of property, purchase of machinery,
and to provide working capital." Listing was not obtained, and
property and machinery were not acquired. The court gave judgment
for the defendant on the ground that the evidence did not show that
the representation was made with the knowledge that there was no
intention to do what was represented. In Hilliker v. jewel Oil & Gas
Co.,26 the prospectus had said that the "'corporation [was] to be
organized under the laws of the State of Michigan." 27 In fact, the
corporation was organized under the laws of Delaware. Holding for
defendant in an action to recover amounts paid under a subscription
contract, the court said that the mere failure to incorporate as
promised, where not shown to be part of a scheme to defraud, is not
sufficient to justify recovery. Finally, in Benedict v. Guardian Trust
Co.,28 the prospectus included a promise that the stock would pay a
one and one-half per cent dividend on the first and fifteenth of each
month. Allowing a shareholder recovery in fraud when the promised
dividends failed to materialize, the court said that "the mere expression of an intention to pay dividends would not furnish the basis for
actionable fraud ....[but that here the representation] was preceded
with the statement of actual earnings ....[and] such representations
were false

...."29

A number of American decisions deal with the question of when an
unfulfilled promise or statement as to future events constitutes fraud
so that a subscription for stock made in reliance thereon may be
rescinded and amounts paid thereunder recovered, or a suit on the
subscription successfully defended. 30 The general rule is that fraud
cannot be based on "'mere' unfulfilled promises or statements as to
future events." 31 Thus a promise that the corporation will pay
25. 263 Ky. 509, 92 S.W.2d 830 (1936).
26. 277 Mich. 96, 268 N.W. 825, aff'd on rehearing, 277 Mich. 615, 270 N.W. 158
(1936).
27. Id. at 101, 268 N.W. at 826.
28. 91 App. Div. 103, 86 N.Y. Supp. 370, aff'd without opinion, 180 N.Y. 558, 73
N.E. 1120 (1904).
29. Id. at 107, 86 N.Y. Supp. at 373.
30. See Annots., 51 A.L.R. 46 (1927); 68 A.L.R. 635 (1930); 91 A.L.R. 1295

(1934); 125 A.L.R. 879 (1940); 27 A.L.R.2d 14 (1953).
31. 4 FLmrca,

PmvATE CORpomanONS § 1667 (1931).
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dividends in the future,32 or that it will erect a manufacturing plant 33

or establish a branch office, 34 will ordinarily not constitute fraud
merely because not made good. But the general rule is subject to
exceptions (1) where the statements are intended as representations
of fact and involve matters peculiarly within the speaker's knowledge,
(2) where the promises or predictions involve misstatements or concealment of existing facts, (3) where the promise is made without
present intention to perform, and (4) where the promise is a device
to defraud. 35 Thus a statement that the company "Was doing a
tremendous business and . .. had the money available to do so and
would declare a 15 per cent dividend on its capital stock in February,
1923" constituted fraud where in fact the company did not have the
money and did not intend to declare a dividend.36 And where a
corporation stated that it intended to erect a plant with the proceeds
of the stock, a finding of fraud was sustained on the ground that the
jury could7 have found that the corporation in fact had no such
3
intention.
As to remedy, the general rule is that a shareholder may not by
injunction control the discretion of the directors and officers of a
corporation in running its internal affairs and conduct. 38 This rule
is subject to a number of exceptions.39 For example, a shareholder
may enjoin a merger carried out in violation of statutory safeguards. 0
And acts in violation of the agreement under which the corporation
was formed may be enjoined.41 Thus, where plaintiff financed the
organization of a corporation under an agreement that he would
designate nine of the eleven directors and that his nominee would be
taught certain secret processes involved in the corporation's business,
but that no one else would be taught these processes, it was held that
he could enjoin the teaching of the secret processes to others.42
Section 90 of the Restatement of Contracts reads as follows: "A
32. See, e.g., Zeh v. Alameda Community Hotel Corp., 122 Cal. App. 366, 10 P.2d
190 (Dist. Ct. App. 1932).
33. See, e.g., Steele v. Coleman, 120 S.C. 158, 110 S.E. 836 (1922).
34. See, e.g., McCoy v. Bankers' Trust Co., 200 S.W. 1138 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918).
35. 4 FLETCHm, op. cit. supra note 31, § 1669.
36. H. W. Smith, Inc. v. Swenson, 105 Cal. App. 60, 286 Pac. 1050 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1930).
37. "It is a matter of daily observation that the publication of a statement that a
corporation will, at a stated future time, declare a large dividend is accepted by the
buying public as a statement of a fact, and results in a great increase in sales of the
corporation's capital stock." Id. at 63-64, 286 Pac. at 1052.
38. 10 FLETCHER, Op.cit. supra note 31, § 4860, at 350-51 (rev. vol. 1961).
39. See 2 HoRNSTmN, COPORATON LAW AND PRAcTncE § 627 (1959).
40. Farris v. Glen Alden Corp., 393 Pa. 427, 143 A.2d 25 (1958).
41. 2 HoaNsTmi, op. cit. supra note 39, § 627.
42. Alley v. Positype Corp. of America, 224 App. Div. 603, 231 N.Y. Supp. 461
(1928).
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promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce
action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the
part of the promisee and which does induce such action or forbearance
is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the
promise." The Baltimore City Circuit Court found this principle
dispositive of the CarterProducts case. The English court of chancery
applied the closely related collateral contract doctrine in the Jacobs
case. The question next to be considered is the scope of application
of promissory estoppel to the prospectus promise context. That is,
when a promise has been made in a prospectus, when should the
courts say that the promisor "should reasonably expect" his promise
to induce action or forbearance? In addition, assuming promissory
estoppel applies, when should injunctive relief be granted?
In answering these questions, a balance must be found between
several conflicting interests. The buyer of stock is bound to be
influenced to some degree by promises in the prospectus. His interest
is to have these promises enforced. But a corporation may promise
in a prospectus to do something which later appears to be unwise.
One advantage of the corporate entity is centralized management
and resultant flexibility of action. The majority shareholders have an
interest in maintaining this flexibility. For example, a soap manufacturer may attempt to raise money for diversification. The prospectus might state that the proceeds of the stock issue would be
used to buy a bleach factory. If the Justice Department subsequently
warns of possible liability under the Clayton Act, the corporation
should be free to back out of the deal. Finally, to permit such actions
might open the door to harassment. For example, suppose a prospectus states that the company manufactures drugs. Is this a promise
that it will continue to manufacture drugs? That it will manufacture
only drugs? That it will not engage in the retail sale of drugs?
When the breaking of a prospectus promise constitutes fraud,43 an
injunction should issue to enjoin the breaking of the promise. Neither
a corporation nor a promoter should be allowed to sell stock by
means of fraudulent promises, and then evade performance of the
4
promises by pointing to the need for corporate freedom of action. "
Outside the area of fraud, however, general rules are less readily
apparent.
43. See text accompanying note 35 supra.
44. Texas provides by statute that "actionable fraud ...with regard to transactions
in stock in corporations shall consist of . . . false promise to do some act in the

future which is made as a material inducement to another party to enter into a
contract and but for which promise said party would not have entered into said
contract. Whenever a promise thus made has not been complied with . . .within a
reasonable time, it shall be presumed that it was falsely and fraudulently made" and
the burden of proof shall shift to the promisor. VERNoN's Txx. Cv. STAT. ANN. art.
4004 (1961).
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Thus, the balance of interests in a newly formed corporation may
be somewhat different from that in a going concern. For one thing,
in selling stock in a newly formed corporation statements of future
action are apt to be relatively more conjectural and uncertain. Again,
there is relatively more need for leeway in "puffing" to sell the stock
of an embryonic enterprise. Corporate promoters may be unable to
assess objectively the prospects for future actions by the corporation
they have brought into existence. On the other hand, subscribers to
stock in a newly formed corporation should be a little more cautious
than in the case of a going concern, and should be held to have
assumed a certain amount of risk as to future developments. As in the
case of newly formed corporations, the balance of interests in close
corporations may also involve special considerations. 45 Assuming a
small close held corporation for which a prospectus has been required, 46 if the stock is not publicly traded there may be a relatively
greater need for protection for the shareholder against the violation
of prospectus promises. His stock will be harder to sell, and he thus
has less chance to recover his investment, if the corporation breaks
prospectus promises.
The character of the promise involved will affect whether or not
the shareholder can reasonably be expected to act in reliance thereon.
Thus, where a corporation states in a prospectus that it will use the
proceeds of the stock issue to build two wood processing plants, and
it later decides to build only one, making it double the originally
planned capacity, the shareholder should not be able to interfere.
On the other hand, if it builds no wood processing plants, but instead
sets up a taxicab company, perhaps the shareholders should be able
to interfere. Perhaps there should be a difference between the result
when the promise concerns future financial policy of the corporation
and the result when the promise concerns future business activity.
There may be less need for flexibility in the former than in the latter,
and in the latter the corporation's actions are more apt to be influenced by circumstances beyond its control but to which it must react.
The result in Carter Products is undoubtedly correct. Apart from
the alternative grounds for the decision, the balancing of interests
completely justifies the application of promissory estoppel. There was
no valid business or financial motive behind the issuance of nonvoting stock. To have issued voting stock would have satisfied the
corporate purpose just as well. On the other hand, injustice was sure
45. Special as opposed to the case of a large publicly-held corporation.
46. For example, under Tennessee law a small closely-held corporation is not
exempt from the blue-sky law unless it has thirty or fewer subscribers to the issue
and the issue involves no more than one hundred thousand dollars. TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 48-1632 (1956).
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to result if the non-voting stock were issued and the common stock
delisted. In general, application of promissory estoppel to the prospectus promise situation seems justifiable. Intelligent application of
that doctrine by using a balancing approach will not unduly hamper
corporate freedom of action. While there may be uncertainty at first,
rules will rapidly become settled which block out large areas. At
least one of these rules will probably be the following: In the absence
of fraud, violation of prospectus promises will not subject the corporation to liability in a suit based on promissory estoppel when the
violation is made necessary by valid business reasons. The stock
purchaser is justified in relying on a promise only to that extent.

